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Conventional  economic  wisdom  holds  that  the  migration  of  unskilled  labor  from  less  developed 
countries  to  neighboring  developed  countries  should  be  expected  to  narrow  the  wage  gap 
between  those  countries,  and  thereby  reduce  the  incentive  for  further  migration.  If  capital  is 
mobile  internationally  this  reasoning  may  be  inappropriate.  Instead,  emigration  of  unskilled 
labor  out  of  the  less  developed  country  provides  an  incentive  for  capital  to  leave  the  country, 
too.  As  a  consequence,  wage  rates  move  in  the  same  direction  in  each  country,  and  the  gap 
between  wage  rates  across  countries  even  may  increase. 
1.  Introduction 
The  Guest  Worker  programs  initiated  by  Western  European  nations  and 
the  more  recent  surge  of  illegal  immigration  into  the  United  States  from 
Latin  America  are  but  two  examples  of  movements  of  predominately 
unskilled  workers  from  less  developed  countries  to  developed  countries. 
Conventional  economic  wisdom  regarding  the  effects  of  such  labor 
movements  suggests  that  the  wages  paid  to  unskilled  workers  in  the  receiving 
country  should  fall  and  that  the  wages  paid  to  their  counterparts  in  the 
country  of  emigration  should  rise.  This  seemingly  incontrovertible  statement 
appears  to  explain  why  proposed  liberalizations  of  immigration  restrictions 
in  developed  countries  often  meet  with  strenuous  objections  from  labor 
groups  while  government  officials  in  less  developed  countries  tend  to  view 
emigration  as  a  vent  for  surplus  unskilled  labor.  If  capital  is  internationally 
mobile,  however,  this  casual  application  of  economic  theory  may  lead  to 
erroneous  predictions  about  the  behavior  of  wage  rates  in  the  face  of  labor 
movements  between  countries.  Also,  the  focus  on  an  alleged  conflict  of 
interest  among  members  of  the  unskilled  worker  group  may  only  serve  to 
draw  attention  away  from  the  probable  increase  in  the  returns  experienced 
by  capital  owners  world-wide. 
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The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  show,  in  the  context  of  a  static,  general 
equilibrium  model,  that  when  unskilled  workers  move  from  a  less  developed 
country  to  a  developed  country:  (1) wages  paid  to  this  type  of  labor  are  likely 
to  fall  in  both  countries  while  the  returns  to  all  capital  owners  rise,  and  (2) 
the  developed  country  accumulates  capital  at  the  expense  of  the  less 
developed  country.  Moreover,  production  technologies  may  differ  sufficiently 
across  countries  that  the  absolute  disparity  between  the  wage  rates  paid  to 
unskilled  labor  in  the  two  countries  actually  may  increase.  These  results 
indicate  that  the  current  dilemma  regarding  illegal  immigration  into  the 
United  States  may  be  persistent.  Even  leaving  aside  the  compounding  factor 
of  divergent  population  growth  rates,  incentives  for  entry  brought  about  by 
international  wage  rate  differences  may  not  tend  to  disappear  when 
emigration  to  the  United  States  occurs. 
The  remainder  of  the  discussion  is  organized  into  three  sections.  Section  2 
presents  the  model  used  while  the  results  stated  above  are  developed  in 
greater  detail  in  section  3.  Implications  and  conclusions  are  drawn  out  in 
section  4. 
2.  The  model 
In  this  model,  two  countries,  A  and  B,  are  assumed  to  make  up  a  closed 
economic  system.  Country  A  is  assumed  to  represent  an  economically 
developed  nation  while  B  represents  one  that  is  economically  less  developed. 
These  countries  produce  two  goods,  X,  and  X,,  using  three  factors,  unskilled 
labor,  L,  skilled  labor,  S,  and  capital,  K.  Output  prices  are  determined 
through  trade  between  the  two  countries.  In  addition,  capital  is  assumed  to 
be  fixed  in  supply  to  both  countries  taken  together  but  perfectly  mobile 
internationally,  while  each  country’s  supply  of  labor  is  completely  inelastic. 
At  first,  these  assumptions  regarding  international  factor  mobility  may  seem 
ill-suited  to  a  study  of  labor  migration  issues.  Labor,  however,  is  subject  to 
comparatively  more  restrictions  on  its  international  mobility  as  compared 
with  capital  and  these  assumptions  do  capture  the  essence  of  this  distinction. 
Labor  migration  is  handled  in  this  formulation  by  parametrically  shifting 
unskilled  labor  across  national  boundaries,  where  such  shifts  reflect  assumed 
changes  in  immigration  policy.  The  factor  mobility  assumptions  adopted  here 
have  the  important  implication,  which  is  roughly  consistent  with  the 
empirical  findings  of  Harberger  (1980),  that  returns  to  capital  owners  must  be 
internationally  identical,  while  if  technologies  differ  across  countries,  wages 
paid  to  labor  will  be  higher  in  one  country  than  another. 
Turning  next  to  the  structure  of  production,  country  A  is  assumed  to 
produce  both  goods,  the  outputs  of  which  are  denoted  as  X,,  and  X,,,  and 
has  available  quantities  of  all  three  factors,  LA, S,,  and  K,.  More  specifically, 
the  two  types  of  labor  are  specific  factors  in  that  L,  is  used  only  in  the 
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intersectorally  mobile  and  may  therefore  be  used  in  either  XIA  or  X,, 
production.  In  contrast  to  country  A,  country  B  is  assumed  to  be  completely 
specialized  in  the  production  of  X,.  This  output,  denoted  X,,,  is  obtained 
using  unskilled  labor,  L,,  and  capital,  K,,  available  in  country  B.  Since  B  is 
assumed  to  possess  no  skilled  labor,  production  of  X,  in  this  country  is 
impossible.  Consequently,  the  pattern  of  trade  involves  B  exporting  XI,  and 
importing  X,,. 
This  simplistic  characterization  of  production  and  trade  patterns  captures 
several  important  aspects  of  economic  relations  between  developed  and 
neighboring  less  developed  countries,  although  it  admittedly  ignores  others 
which  may  be  critical  in  the  context  of  different  policy  questions.  Production 
of  a  set  of  high  technology  goods  in  the  developed  country  alone,  where 
skilled  labor  is  much  more  readily  available,  does  not  conflict  too  sharply 
with  actual  experience.  The  greater  diversification  of  the  developed  country’s 
economy,  implicit  in  this  formulation,  would  appear  to  be  a  warranted 
simplification  as  well.’  The  assumption  of  full  employment  in  the  developing 
country  may  seem  less  appropriate.  However,  if  wage  rigidity  and 
unemployment  were  assumed  to  exist  instead,  the  set  of  questions  addressed 
would  deal  with  the  net  impact  on* unemployment  as  a  consequence  of  the 
initial  migration  to  the  developed  country,  and  the  answers  should  rest  on 
the  same  factors  identified  here.2  While  less  developed  countries  do  in  reality 
have  skilled  portions  of  their  work-forces,  this  proportion  generally  is  much 
smaller  than  in  developed  countries.  More  importantly,  the  immigration  from 
neighboring  less  developed  countries  which  has  occurred  in  the  European 
and  U.S.  cases  cited  in  the  introduction  is  dominated  by  the  movement  of 
unskilled  labor.3 
The  equations  describing  the  production  side  of  the  model  are  quite 
similar  to  those  found  in  Jones  (1965,  1971).  Underlying  assumptions  are:  (1) 
production  functions  for  each  good  produced  exhibit  constant  returns  to 
scale,  and  (2)  factor  and  commodity  markets  are  perfectly  competitive. 
Together,  these  two  assumptions  imply  that  all  factors  of  production  are  fully 
employed  and  that  enterpreneurs  earn  zero  profits.  For  country  A,  the  full 
employment  conditions  are: 
(21  x1.4  = LA, 
‘By  allowing  for  a  single  sector  in  the  less  developed  country,  any  consideration  of  internal 
migration  from  one  sector  to  another  in  that  country  is  ruled  out.  For  contributions  which 
address  that  issue,  see  Harris  and  Todaro  (1970)  and  Bhagwati  and  Srinivasan  (1974). 
‘As  shown  in  the  next  section  of  the  paper,  a  key  causal  factor  in  the  model  is  that  the  greater 
availability  of  unskilled  labor  in  the  developed  country  attracts  capital  out  of  the  developing 
country.  Whether  that  capital  movement  leads  to  a  fall  in  wages  or  a  fall  in  employment 
opportunities  in  the  developing  country  depends  upon  the  initial  assumption  of  flexible  or  rigid 
wages,  but  clearly  either  outcome  presents  social  problems  in  the  developing  country. 
‘For  an  excellent  collection  of  papers  dealing  with  the  emigration  of  skilled  labor  from  less 
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c&x,*=s.4,  (2) 
and  the  zero  profit  conditions  are: 
c;),  W,SC$,r=P,=l,  (4) 
c&q  + c;,r =  P,  = P, 
where  Cc  denotes  the  input-output  coefficient  describing  the  average 
quantity  of  factor  i  (i=L,,S,,  KA)  used  to  produce  one  unit  of  commodity  j 
(j=  1,2)  in  country  A,  WA denotes  the  wage  paid  to  unskilled  labor  in  A,  4 
denotes  the  wage  paid  to  skilled  labor  in  A,  r  denotes  the  common  return  to 
the  owners  of  capital  in  both  countries,  and  P=P,/P,  denotes  the  common 
commodity  price  ratio  prevailing  in  both  countries. 
In  country  B,  the  full  employment  and  zero  profit  equations  are  analagous 
to  those  for  A.  Specifically: 
C::,X,l3=L*,  (6) 
c;,x1,=  K,,  (7) 
c;, w,+c;,r= 1, 
where  all  variable  definitions  parallel  those  given  in  the  model  for  country  A. 
Note,  however,  that  CF,  and  Ci,  would  differ  from  their  counterparts  for 
country  A  due  to  international  differences  in  technology  which  result  in 
differences  in  the  wage-rental  ratio.  Alternatively,  such  differences  would 
arise  if  distortions  in  the  output  market  meant  that  different  relative  prices 
were  faced  in  the  two  countries4 
Finally,  the  production  side  of  the  model  is  completed  by:  (1)  constraining 
the  sum  of  K,  and  K,  to  be  fixed  at  K, 
K,+K,=K,  (9) 
and  (2) constraining  the  sum  of  L,  and  L,  to  be  fixed  at  L, 
L,+L,=L.  (10) 
41f technologies  used  in  the  production  of  X,  are  identical  in  each  country,  then  if  the  same 
product  prices  and  returns  to  capital  are  faced  in  each  country,  the  wage  rates  in  each  country 
must  be  identical.  An  initial  wage  gap  and  the  economic  incentive  for  migration  internationally 
does  not  exist  in  that  situation. S.D.  Gerking  and  J.H.  Mutti,  International  migration  of  unskilled  labor  371 
The  demand  side  of  the  model  insures  that  commodity  markets  are  always 
in  equilibrium  and  that  payments  balance  for  both  countries.  Commodity 
market  equilibrium  equations  may  be  expressed  as: 
D, =D,(P,  Y)=X,  =x,,+x,,,  (11) 
D, = D,(P, Y)  = x,,,  (14 
Y=  Y*+  Y,,  (13) 
where  Dj  denotes  the  total  demand  for  commodity  j  in  countries  A  and  B 
taken  together  and  Yi  denotes  real  income  in  country  i  (i=  A, B).  These  two 
equations  embody  the  assumptions  that  tastes  in  the  two  countries  are 
identical  and  homothetic,  and  that  total  demand  for  each  commodity  must 
equal  total  supply.  Eqs.  (1 l),  (12),  and  (13)  however,  do  not  guarantee 
balance  of  payments  equilibrium  for  either  country.  Consequently,  eqs.  (14) 
and  (15)  are  added  in  order  to  insure  this  outcome: 
(X,.-D,.)+P(X,,-D,,)+r(lc,-K,)=O,  (14) 
(X,,-D,,)-PDzH+r(K,-K,)=O,  (15) 
where  Dji  denotes  the  demand  for  commodity  j  in  country  i  and  ~~ denotes 
the  quantity  of  capital  owned  by  residents  of  country  i.  Eq.  (14),  then, 
requires  that,  for  country  A,  the  value  of  net  exports  plus  net  foreign 
earnings  must  equal  zero.  Note  that  this  formulation  does  not  take  into 
account  remittances  sent  by  workers  back  to  the  developing  country,  a 
distinction  which  is  unimportant  as  long  as  identical  homothetic  tastes  are 
assumed.  Taken  together,  the  two  balance  of  payments  restrictions  imply  that 
one  of  the  commodity  market  equilibrium  equations  is  redundant,  and  eq. 
(12)  is  dropped  from  further  consideration. 
In  summary,  the  model  to  be  applied  in  the  following  section  consists  of 
eqs.  (1)  through  (15)  excepting  (12).  Attention  there  is  directed  to  the  case 
where  the  international  difference  in  technology  applied  in  X,  production 
results  in  WA>  W,.  The  effects  on  W,,  W,  and  r  resulting  from  a 
simultaneous  increase  in  L,  and  decrease  L,  satisfying  eq.  (10)  are  of  primary 
interest.  That  parametric  shift  in  unskilled  labor  supplies,  which  is 
economically  consistent  with  the  assumed  direction  of  the  initial  wage  gap, 
could  arise  if A  liberalized  immigration  policy  toward  B  or  reduced  the  vigor 
with  which  existing  immigration  statutes  are  enforced. 
3.  Effects  of  unskilled  labor  migration  in  factor  rewards 
This  section  focuses  on  changes  in:  (1)  the  nominal  rewards  paid  to 
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of  capital  in  both  countries,  and  (3)  the  quantity  of  capital  employed  in  both 
countries  in  the  face  of  an  international  movement  of  unskilled  labor.  Effects 
on  the  remaining  endogenous  variables  are  not  of  major  interest  in  this 
study,  but  are  given  in  the  appendix. 
The  existence  of  capital  mobility  in  this  model  has  some  rather  unexpected 
implications  for  the  behavior  of  wage  rates  paid  to  unskilled  labor  in  both 
countries.  In  particular,  rewriting  the  zero  profit  equations  for  Xi,  and  X,, 
in  relative  rates  of  change  and  then  solving  for  Wi  and  W$  yields: 
w; = - (eA,,/e;,)r*,  (16) 
W,* =  -(9~1/9~l)r*,  (17) 
where  Z*  =dZ/Z,  6;,  =  Cj),r,  and  the  remaining  Ofj are  similarly  defined. 
Eqs.  (16)  and  (17)  show  that  in  response  to  a  movement  of  unskilled  workers 
from  the  less  developed  country  B  to  the  developed  country  A:  (1)  WA  and 
W,  move  in  the  same,  rather  than  in  the  opposite  direction,  (2) both  WA  and 
W,  move  in  the  opposite  direction  from  the  change  in  r, and  (3) since,  as  will 
be  demonstrated  below,  r  may  move  in  either  direction,  both  WA  and  W, 
could  actually  rise.  These  results  contrast  with  the  impressionistic  conjectures 
mentioned  in  the  introduction  regarding  the  probable  behavior  of  these  two 
variables.  Apparently,  these  conjectures  are  based  upon  an  assumption  of 
capital  immobility  between  the  two  countries.  That  is,  if  capital  were 
immobile,  then  the  wage  rate  paid  to  L,  would  rise  because  fewer  workers 
would  be  employed  there  using  a  capital  stock  of  a  fixed  size. 
The  direction  of  change  in  the  rental  rate  of  return  to  capital  is 
unambiguously  positive  (negative)  if  the  signs  of  the  two  expressions  shown 
in  eqs.  (18)  and  (19)  are  both  positive  (negative): 
(K lAIk4)  - uwh3) 5%  0,  (18) 
(xl.IL)-(xlBILJ~o.  (19) 
Therefore,  if  the  capital-labor  ratio  in  the  production  of  Xi,  exceeds  that 
for  X1,  and  if  average  productivity  of  unskilled  labor  is  higher  in  country  A 
than  in  B,  r*/Lz >O.  To  illustrate  conditions  under  which  both  eqs.  (18)  and 
(19)  would  be  positive  or  negative,  consider  the  special  case  where  Xi,  and 
X1,  are  produced  according  to  different  Cobb-Douglas  type  production 
functions.  Suppose 
X  1A  =MK”  L’-a 
1A  A  >  (20) 
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where  M #iV  and/or  c(  #fl.  The  marginal  products  of  unskilled  labor  in  the 
two  countries  are 
MPL,=(l  -a)X,JLA=(l  -a)M(K,,/L,)“,  (22) 
MPL,=(l  -p)X,,/L,=(l  -fl)N(KJL,#.  (23) 
The  previously  stated  assumptions  of:  (1)  perfect  competition,  (2)  W, > W,, 
and  (3)  identical  commodity  prices  in  both  countries,  guarantee  that 
MPL,/MPL,>  1.  The  condition  MPL,/MPL,>  1,  however,  does  not  imply 
that  the  differences  shown  in  eqs.  (18)  and  (19)  will  be  either  positive  or 
negative.  That  proposition  easily  can  be  demonstrated  by  multiplying 
expressions  for  MPLJMPL,  and  (XIA/L,)/(X,,/L,)  by  the  ratio  of  the 
marginal  products  of  capital  in  Xi,  and  Xi,  production.  Since  the  rental 
rate  of  return  to  capital  is  identical  in  both  countries,  MPK,./MPK,=  1 and 
the  multiplications  described  produce: 
W.JWB=(MPLJMPL,)(MPKIA/MPK,)>  1  (24) 
= (1  - 4PW  I AILM~ - PMKBILB)  ’  1,  (25) 
(XI./LJ/(X,B/LB)  = WK,A/L)“IWGJL,)~  (26) 
= B(KIA/LAMKB/LB).  (27) 
In  relating  these  results  to  (18)  and  (19X one  obvious  situation  to  consider 
is  where  CI  =fi  (the  case  where  the  technological  differences  favoring  the 
developed  country  A  are  factor  neutral).  More  specifically,  if  a=/?,  eqs.  (25) 
and  (27)  show  that  unambiguously,  (KJL,)  -(KB/LB)  > 0  and  (X,./L,) 
-(X1,/L,)  > 0, and,  as  noted  above,  r*/Li  >O.  Additionally,  that  same  sign 
pattern  for  eqs.  (18)  and  (19)  must  hold  if  the  output  elasticity  of  capital  is 
larger  in  country  A  than  in  B,  i.e.  cx  > /3. However,  if  /I>  ~1,  then  possibly  eqs. 
(18)  and  (19)  both  will  be  negative  or  will  have  opposite  signs. 
To  establish  an  economic  rationale  underlying  the  behavior  of  r,  assume 
that  sufficient  conditions  exist  guaranteeing  a  positive  sign  on  both  eqs.  (18) 
and  (19).  Under  those  conditions,  when  unskilled  labor  is  transferred  from 
country  B  to  country  A,  world  output  of  X,  rises  by  more  than  any  possible 
increase  in  X,  production,  thus  driving  up  P = P,/P,  to  clear  world  markets. 
The  distributional  effects  that  will  be  simultaneously  observed  in  this 
situation  can  be  deduced  from  a  more  general  result  developed  by  Batra  and 
Casas  (1976)  in  their  comprehensive  analysis  of  production  relationships  in  a 
three-factor-two-good  setting.  Their  theorem  9  states  that  a  rise  in  the 
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relatively  intensively  by  the  other  good.  In  the  present  situation,  then,  when 
the  relative  price  of  X,  rises,  the  return  to  unskilled  labor  falls.  Hence,  from 
zero-profit  eq.  (16)  the  return  to  capital  rises. 
Interestingly,  in  the  broader  case  where  eqs.  (18)  and  (19)  are  not 
unambiguously  positive  and  the  sign  of  r-*/L:  may  be  positive,  negative,  or 
indeterminate,  capital  must  flow  out  of  country  B  and  into  country  A 
whenever  there  is  an  international  migration  of  unskilled  labor  in  that  same 
direction.  To  understand  this  result,  let  rA  and  rB  denote  respectively  capital’s 
rental  rate  in  countries  A  and  B,  where  in  equilibrium  r,-r,=O.  If  K,  is 
held  constant,  then  a  small  increase  in  L,,  and  corresponding  reduction  in 
L,,  would  increase  W,  relative  to  W,.  5 From  eqs.  (16)  and  (17),  then  rA-rB 
would  rise.  Also,  if  L,  is  held  constant,  then  a  small  increase  in  K,,  and 
corresponding  reduction  in  K,,  would  lower  rA-rR.  Thus,  the  maintenance 
of  the  equilibrium  condition  r A-  rR  =  0  implies  that  a  small  increase  in  L, 
must  be  accompanied  by  a  corresponding  increase  in  K,,  a  result  indicating 
that  when  country  A  liberalizes  immigration  policy  or  relaxes  border 
enforcement,  B loses  both  labor  and  capital. 
Consider  again  the  case  where  a  movement  of  unskilled  workers  from 
country  B  to  country  A  unambiguously  results  in  a  decline  in  both  W,  and 
W,.  If  WA  and  W,  both  fall,  the  possibility  exists  that  the  gap  between  W, 
and  W,  may  actually  increase  in  the  face  of  a  transfer  of  unskilled  workers 
from  B  to  A.  A  necessary,  although  not  sufficient,  condition  for  this  situation 
to  arise  is  that  the  percentage  decline  in  W,  be  greater  than  the  percentage 
decline  in  WA.  From  eqs.  (16)  and  (17)  that  case  can  be  seen  to  occur  when 
This  expression  depends  upon  factor  intensity  measures  expressed  in  value 
terms.  Such  a  comparison,  based  on  the  ratio  of  capital’s  share  versus  labor’s 
share  of  output  in  the  production  of  X,  across  both  countries,  contrasts  with 
the  definitions  in  physical  terms  which  appeared  in  eq.  (19).  The  two 
measures  may  give  different  results  when  W,  >  W,.  A  similar  distinction 
between  physical  intensities  and  value  intensities  has  played  a  key  role  in  the 
voluminous  literature  on  factor  market  distortions.6  The  present  focus  is 
slightly  different,  since  attention  here  is  paid  to  differences  across  countries  in 
the  two  intensity  definitions,  and  not  differences  across  industries  within  a 
country. 
How  likely  is  this  condition  to  be  met?  Recall  the  particular  example 
mentioned  above,  which  rested  on  CobbbDouglas  production  functions  and 
factor-neutral  technological  superiority  in  country  A.  Under  these  conditions 
5This  result  can  be  derived  from  theorem  1  of  Batra  and  Casas  (1976). 
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where  the  value  shares  of  capital  and  labor  are  identical  in  each  country, 
then  eqs.  (16)  and  (17)  show  that  wages  change  by  the  same  percentage  in 
each  country  and  the  wage  gap  remains  constant  in  percentage  terms. 
Additionally,  while  the  extent  of  country  A’s  technological  superiority  helps 
determine  the  size  of  the  initial  wage  gap,  that  factor  does  not  affect  the 
percentage  wage  changes  which  result  from  labor  migration.  This  outcome  of 
a  constant  proportional  wage  gap  suggests  little  reason  for  optimism  with 
respect  to  the  potential  equilibrating  tendency  of  greater  immigration  into 
advanced  countries  to  cause  the  current  wage  gap  to  disappear.  In  the  more 
general  case,  if  capital’s  share  of  X,  output  in  country  B  exceeds  that  of 
country  A,  an  even  more  pessimistic  conclusion  might  follow,  namely  that 
the  wage  gap  could  increase.’  That  is,  if  p>  CC,  then  r*/Li  still  could  be 
positive  and,  in  that  case,  the  percentage  decline  in  WB would  be  larger  than 
the  percentage  decline  in  WA. 
4.  Summary 
This  paper  has  projected  some  of  the  likely  impacts  on  income  distribution 
of  the  inflow  of  unskilled  labor  into  developed  countries  from  neighboring 
less  developed  countries.  Because  internationally  mobile  capital  is 
incorporated  into  the  static,  general  equilibrium  model  used,  the  analysis 
develops  several  counter-intuitive  implications  of  greater  labor  migration. 
The  key  behavioral  factor  is  that  the  greater  availability  of  unskilled  labor  in 
the  developed  country  will  attract  capital  out  of  the  less  developed  country. 
Even  though  the  direction  of  this  capital  flow  can  be  stated  unambiguously, 
the  effect  on  wage  rates  and  returns  to  capital  cannot  be  predicted  without 
additional  information.  When  both  the  capital-labor  ratio  and  output  labor 
ratio  in  the  developed  country  are  greater  than  the  less  developed  country, 
wage  rates  in  both  countries  will  fall.  Furthermore,  the  gap  between  the  wage 
rates  in  the  two  countries  even  may  increase. 
Appendix 
The  purpose  of  this  appendix  is  to  provide  algebraic  detail  regarding  some 
of  the  results  presented  in  the  text.  To  solve  for  the  direction  of  change  in  the 
endogenous  variables  with  respect  to  an  increase  in  unskilled  workers  from 
country  B  entering  country  A,  the  equations  of  the  model  are  rewritten  in 
relative  rates  of  change.  For  the  production  side  in  country  A: 
XTA + y;(r*  -  WZ) = L;  (A.11 
‘These  comments  are  based  on  an  illustrative  example  only,  which  nevertheless  demonstrates 
that  even  in  a  fairly  structured  situation,  few  unambiguous  results  hold.  When  other  restrictions 
are  relaxed,  such  as  the  assumed  elasticity  of  factor  substitution  of  one  in  a  Cobb-Douglas 
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where  Z*  =dZ/Z,  ~~j =  C~jXj~K,  denotes  the  fraction  of  K,  employed  in 
the  production  of  commodity  j,  8 &=&r/P  denotes  capital’s  share  of  the 
output  of  commodity  2,  and  the  remainder  of  the  Aij  and  8,  are  similarly 
defined.  Also,  yt  = et,oT,  yc = &a$  y&. = At,  @,a:,  y&  = ~~,t&&  and 
A  A  A  yKK=  yXL+  yKS,  where  09  denotes  the  elasticity  of  substitution  in  the 
production  of  commodity  j  in  country  A. 
Expressions  for  country  B’s  production  relations  may  be  presented  in  an 
analogous  fashion.  In  relative  rates  of  change  the  full  employment  equations 
are: 
XTB + yF(r* -  Wg)  = LB*,  (‘4.6) 
XTB  + yg(  Wg  -  r*) = Kg  (A.7) 
where  yi  = BB  K1~T, y~=8~,a~,  and  iEl  =AE1 =  1, while  the  zero  profit  equation 
is: 
e;,w$+e$,r*=o.  64.8) 
The  full  employment  equations  for  country  B  are  tied  to  those  for  country  A 
via  the  factor  supply  relations: 
K*=k,K;+k,K,*=O,  64.9) 
L* =  1,LX +  1, LB*  = 0,  (A.lO) 
where  lj = L,/L  and  kj = KJK  for j = A,  B. 
Finally,  the  demand  side  of  the  model  may  be  compressed  to  one  reduced 
form  equation.  First,  observe  that  when  no  net  saving  takes  place  in  either 
country,  the  total  value  of  expenditures  by  a  country’s  residents  must  equal 
the  total  value  of  national  income: 
(A.1 1) 
(A.12) 
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guaranteed  by  substituting  eqs.  (13)  (A.1 l),  and  (A.12)  into  eq.  (1 l),  and  then 
expressing  the  result  in  relative  rates  of  change  as: 
(A.13) 
where  I7 1A=X1A(Y-~YX1)IX1I:  ~IB=XIB(Y-rl,XI)IXIE;  ~,*=@X,*II: 
CC,  denotes  the  income  compensated  elasticity  of demand  for  X,  calculated  with 
respect  to  a  change  in  P=  PJP,,  and  vu  denotes  the  income  elasticity  of 
demand  for  X,  which  is  equal  to  unity  under  the  assumption  of  homothetic 
tastes.  Since  c(~ is  assumed  to  be  positive  and  since  the  difference  (Y--11,X,) 
is  necessarily  non-negative,  the  coefficients  Ki’,,,  III,,,  and  UT,,  are  non- 
negative  as  well. 
A  more  complete  derivation  of  eq.  (A.13)  is  as  follows.  Write  eq.  (11)  in 
relative  rates  of  change  as: 
x:=(X,,/X,)X:,+(X,,/X,)XT,=~~P*+~,Y*,  (A.14) 
where  cl;  denotes  the  ordinary  price  elasticity  of  demand  for  X,.  Next,  write 
the  income  equations  in  (A.1 1) and  (A.12)  in  relative  rates  of change  as: 
yi  = (XdYAWL  + (w,,m,  + p*) 
(A.15) 
(A.16) 
Substituting  (A.15)  and  (A.16)  into  (A.17): 
Y*=(Y*/Y)Y;+(Y,/Y)Y$.  (A.17) 
And  then  substituting  this  result  into  (A.14)  produces  the  expression  reported 
in  eq.  (A.13). 
The  algebraic  results  from  the  model  not  presented  in  the  text  are: 
ID I=  -~,e~,8SA2(Y~+Y~)--Clpu~lu~1kAH~~2YSA 
-~,@&&3~~&  -  a,%  k&&I&  + F&,Yk) 
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+apesqe~,(n~,kABy~+lA,y~)+~  oB  o*  8*  k  1  Y*  P  Ll  Ll  X2  AB  AL3  KS 
+ap6~10~ld~2kABlABy~L+  CL  dB  8*  8*  k  1  )J*  P Ll  Kl  Ll  AB  AB  KK 
+  BB  8*  k  1  IT  y*  yA+d;l@lkABIABy~  Ll  Kl  AB  AB  2A  KL  S 
+  @l&Y~[kAB(Y~S  +  %,Y,“)  +  n2AYi?]+  dB  8*  k  n  1  y*y*  Ll  Ll  AB  2A  AB  S  KL 
+  @&&&&&(d!  +  lABYt)  +  oB  eA  k  IT  YB(YA  +  ‘%,Y,A)  Ll  Ll  AB  1A  L  KS 
+  BB  B*  k  17  1  y*(y*  + %;,y$)}/I  D ( 50,  Ll  Ll  AB  1A  AB  L  KS  (A.20) 
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The  fact  that  Kz/L;E  20 may  be  proved  as  follows.  Consider  the  sum  of  the 
positively  signed  terms  in  the  numerator: 
Next  combine  this  result  with  two  negatively  signed  terms  to  form 
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Substituting  for  the  r~j produces: 
S=o*  eB  1  n  ?*  oBoA-e~18~,(3,~,II,A+~~A~~,)a~o~  Ll  Ll  AB  1B ‘K2  1  2 
-BA  n  /I*  dA  cPfJ*  Ll  1A  K2  S2  1  2>  (A.27) 
which  can  be  rewritten  as: 
or 
s= b~~~e;~2A[WB~A(Y-X1)-~KlA&-XI*(Y-Xl)]~0,  (A.29) 
A  1 
since  by  assumption  WB <  WA and  W,L,  5  Xl,: 
+  u2A(1A,  -  %l’fAB)l 
(A.30) 
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